Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Political elections: Political elections are a process by which citizens choose people to represent them in government. Elections are typically held at regular intervals, and voters can choose from a variety of candidates. Elections are not conducted by the state, but by the people. See also Democracy, Electoral systems._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Public Choice Theory on Political Elections - Dictionary of Arguments
Parisi I 184 Political Elections/Public choice theory/Farber: (…) the most obvious shortfall of [public choice] theory is that it cannot explain why so many people turn out to vote (Mashaw, 2010(1), p. 33). The chance that an individual voter will change the outcome of an election is virtually zero except in the smallest village, yet millions of people vote in national elections. Efforts have been made to explain away these "anomalies." (See Stearns and Zywicki, 2009(2), pp. 21-26 for a survey of the efforts with respect to the electorate.) But these explanations turn out to be vacuous (people vote because they derive welfare from the act of voting) or simply false (organizations representing large groups succeed only by offering non-political services to members) (Mashaw, 2010)(1). >Interest groups/Public choice theory, >Governmental structures/Public choice theory. On closer examination, the story of special interest dominance has many holes (Croley, 2010)(3). >Interest groups/Public choice theory, >Jury theorem/Public choice theory, >Arrow’s theorem/Public choice theory. 1. Mashaw, J. (2010). "Public Law and Public Choice: Critique and Rapprochement," in D. A. Farber and A. J. O'Connell, eds., Research Handbook on Public Choice and Public Law, 19-48. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. 2. Stearns, M. L. and T. J. Zywicki (2009). Public Choice Concepts and Applications in Law. St. Paul, MN: Thomas Reuters. 3. Croley, S. (2010). "Interest Groups and Public Choice," in D. A. Farber and A. J. O'Connell, eds., Research Handbook on Public Choice and Public Law, 49—86. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. Farber, Daniel A. “Public Choice Theory and Legal Institutions”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Public Choice Theory Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
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> Counter arguments against Public Choice Theory
> Counter arguments in relation to Political Elections
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-27